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Landscape for Patent Remedies
Bernard H. Chao*
INTRODUCTION
On May 15, 2006, the United States Supreme Court 
decided eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., and overruled 
years of Federal Circuit precedent governing the issuance 
of permanent injunctions.1  Under existing Federal Circuit 
law, once a defendant has been determined to infringe a 
valid  patent,  there was  a  “general  rule  that  courts  will 
issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement 
absent exceptional circumstances.”2  The only recognized 
exception  to  this  rule  was  a  narrow  “public  interest” 
exception,3 in  which  “a  court  may  decline  to  enter  an 
injunction  when  ‘a  patentee's  failure  to  practice  the 
patented invention frustrates an important public need for 
the invention,’” such as the need to use an invention to 
protect public health.4  This narrow exception was rarely 
used.5
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1
1
. eBay,  Inc.  v.  MercExchange,  L.L.C.  (eBay  III),  547  U.S.  388 
(2006).
2
2
. MercExchange,  L.L.C. v.  eBay,  Inc. (eBay  II), 401  F.3d  1323, 
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 
1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
3
3
. Id.  (quoting Rite-Hite  Corp.  v.  Kelley  Co.,  Inc.,  56  F.3d 1538, 
1547–48 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995)).
4
4
. Id.
5
5
. See, Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (C.D. Cal. 
1987) (public interest in the availability of medical test kits justified a 
denial of a preliminary injunction), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 64 
U.S.P.Q.  285  (9th  Cir.  1945)  (public  interest  warranted  refusal  of 
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In eBay,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  permanent 
injunctions in patent cases should be determined using the 
same four  factor  test  that courts have historically  used in 
other  contexts  when  deciding  whether  to  issue  an 
injunction.6 That test requires courts to analyze: (1) whether 
the  plaintiff  will  suffer  irreparable  harm  without  the 
injunction; (2) whether there is an adequate remedy at law; 
(3) the balance of hardships on the respective parties; and 
(4)  whether  granting  an  injunction  would  disservice  the 
public  interest.   In  view  of  this  new  standard,  many 
successful  patent  plaintiffs  will  no  longer  be  granted  a 
permanent injunction.  This has led courts to face two sets of 
new  issues:  (1)  identifying  what  facts  are  important  in 
determining whether to issue a permanent injunction in  a 
patent  case,  and  (2)  determining  how  to  handle  future 
infringement after a permanent injunction is denied.
The  lower  courts  have  now  had  almost  two  years  to 
interpret  eBay and  identify  what  facts  are  important  in 
determining when permanent injunctions will be issued.  This 
Article  provides  a  critical  analysis  of  these  cases7,  and 
discusses  fact  patterns  that  should  be  considered  when 
deciding  whether  to  issue  a  permanent  injunction. 
Specifically,  this  critique  utilizing  the  recent  lower  court 
decisions  assesses  how  reliance  on  specific  fact  patterns 
balances (or, perhaps, undermines) the goals of the patent 
system—promoting innova-tion without stifling competition.8 
A permanent injunction has the effect of both denying the 
public at least some benefit from the patented invention and 
bestowing  an  economic  reward  for  developing  patented 
technology to the patent holder.  By using economic analysis 
to  characterize  the  issues,  courts  should  be  able  to 
consistently  apply  the  eBay factors  to  grant  or  deny 
injunctions in a manner that furthers the goals of the patent 
injunction on irradiation of oleomargarine).
6
6
. eBay III, 547 U.S. at 394.
7
7
. The  review  attempted  to  encompass  all  Federal  Circuit  cases 
through February 2008.  However,  the author did not review all  district 
court  decisions.   Instead,  cases  from the most  common patent  forums, 
most notably the Eastern District of Texas, and specific high profile cases 
were reviewed.
8
8
. See  FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N,  TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER BALANCE OF  
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1–14 (2003) (discussing goals of patent 
policy),  available  at  http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/  innovationrpt.pdf 
[hereinafter INNOVATION].
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system.
After  eBay,  successful  patents  plaintiffs  cannot  obtain 
permanent injunctions as a matter of course.  Instead, these 
plaintiffs will have to satisfy the four factor test.  Thus, for 
the first time, courts confront issues of remedies for future 
infringement  where  the  accused  infringer  continues  to 
violate the terms of the patent.  Without a clear statutory 
basis for doing so, some courts have granted plaintiffs  an 
ongoing royalty (a compulsory license that is only available 
to  the  losing  defendant).    This  Article  suggests  that  the 
courts do not have the authority to grant ongoing royalties. 
However, that is not as problematic as it might appear.  Due 
to  the  availability  of  other  remedies,  courts  can  “do 
nothing.”   Even  if  a  court  were  to  refuse  to  impose  an 
ongoing royalty, defendants still must choose between: (1) 
avoiding future infringement, (2) negotiating a license, or (3) 
risking a second lawsuit  that  should result  in  a finding of 
willful infringement and enhanced damages.  This solution 
should adequately guard a patent holder’s rights within the 
current statutory framework.
This Article is structured so that Part I describes the facts 
and holding of the eBay decision.  Part II analyzes decisions 
applying  eBay’s  four  factor  test  and  identifies  three 
categories of fact patterns that have played a prominent role 
in  determining  whether  or  not  to  grant  a  permanent 
injunction.  These categories are: (1) the existence or lack of 
direct competition, (2) the institutional status of the plaintiff 
(e.g.  research  institution  or  troll),  and  (3)  the  relative 
contribution  the  patented  invention  has  to  the  infringing 
device. This Article discusses how courts have applied the 
four factor test to cases that possess these fact patterns and 
how the application does or does not meet the goals of the 
patent system.
Part  III  goes  on  to  discuss  what  happens  when  a 
permanent injunction is not issued.  Part III A describes one 
approach that the Federal Circuit has approved, granting a 
compulsory license to the losing defendant which the courts 
now  call  an  “ongoing  royalty.”   This  Article  explores  the 
purported  basis  for  this  remedy and argues  that  it  is  not 
reasoned.  Part III B suggests that courts should not award 
an ongoing royalty in place of a permanent injunction.  The 
doctrine of willful infringement allows a prevailing plaintiff to 
continue  to  enforce  its  patent  in  the  absence  of  both  a 
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permanent injunction and an ongoing royalty.
I. THE FACTS OF eBAY
In eBay, the defendant and its wholly owned subsidiary, 
Half.com, operated websites that allow private sellers to list 
goods they wish to sell,  either through an auction or at a 
fixed price.  Plaintiff MercExchange L.L.C. held a number of 
patents,  including  U.S.  Patent  No.  5,845,265,  a  business 
method patent for an electronic market designed to facilitate 
the sale of goods between private individuals by establishing 
a  central  authority  to  promote  trust  among  participants. 
MercExchange  filed  a  patent  infringement  action  against 
eBay  and  Half.com.  A  jury  found  that  the  MercExchange 
patent was valid and infringed, and awarded damages.
After  the  jury  verdict,  the  district  court  denied 
MercExchange’s  motion  for  permanent  injunctive  relief. 
Although the district court cited to the general rule favoring 
permanent injunctions in patent cases, the court denied the 
injunction by analyzing the traditional four factor test used in 
other types of cases.9  The Federal Circuit reversed, applying 
its general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions 
against  patent  infringement  absent  exceptional  circum-
stances.10  That  rule  was  based  on  the  Patent  Act  which 
states  that  “patents  shall  have  the  attributes  of  personal 
property”11 and  grants  “the  right  to  exclude  others  from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention.”12 
The  Federal  Circuit  explained  that  because  the  right  to 
exclude  is  “the  essence  of  the  concept  of  property,”  the 
general  rule is that a permanent injunction will  issue to a 
prevailing plaintiff.13
In  a  short  opinion  authored  by  Justice  Thomas,  the 
Supreme  Court  reversed  the  Federal  Circuit  and  its  long 
standing  precedent.  The  opinion  began  by  outlining  the 
traditional  factors  used  to  determine  whether  to  issue  a 
9
9
. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (eBay I), 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 
711 (E.D. Va. 2003).
10
1
. eBay II, 401 F.3d at 1339.
11
1
. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
12
1
. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
13
1
. eBay II, 401 F.3d at 1338 (citing  Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 
868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
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permanent injunction:
According  to  well-established  principles  of  equity,  a  plaintiff 
seeking  a  permanent  injunction  must  satisfy  a  four-factor  test 
before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: 
(1)  that  it  has  suffered  an  irreparable  injury;  (2)  that  remedies 
available at  law, such as monetary damages,  are inadequate to 
compensate  for  that  injury;  (3)  that,  considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity 
is  warranted;  and  (4)  that  the  public  interest  would  not  be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.14
The  opinion  stated  that  “these  principles  apply  with 
equal force” in patent cases and that nothing in the Patent 
Act  indicates  that  Congress  intended  a  departure  from 
them.15 Thus,  the  Supreme  Court’s  interpretation  of  the 
Patent Act was very different than the Federal Circuit’s.  The 
Court noted that “creation of a right [under §§ 154, 261] is 
distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that 
right.”16 Since  §  261  states  that  it  is  “[s]ubject  to  the 
provisions of this title” including, presumably, § 283 which 
states injunctive relief may only issue “in accordance with 
the principles of equity,” the decision did not find a general 
rule  favoring  permanent  injunctions.17 As  a  result,  the 
Supreme  Court  held  that  the  Federal  Circuit  erred  by 
incorrectly  applying  a  different  set  of  standards  for 
injunctions  in  patents  cases  than  for  other  cases. 
Specifically, the Court stated:
We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive 
relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and 
that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional 
principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases 
governed by such standards.18
The  Supreme  Court  also  criticized  the  district  court’s 
analysis: “[a]lthough the District Court recited the traditional 
four-factor  test,   it  appeared  to  adopt  certain  expansive 
principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in 
a broad swath of cases.”19  The Supreme Court rejected such 
a  categorical  rule  because  it  was  not  consistent  with  the 
14
1
. eBay III, 547 U.S. at 391 (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 
U.S. 305, 311–13 (1982));  Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 
(1987)).
15
1
. eBay III, 547 U.S. at 391.
16
1
. Id. at. 392.
17
1
. Id.
18
1
. Id. at 395.
19
1
. Id. (citations omitted).
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principles of equity and Supreme Court precedent.20
On remand,  the  district  court  conducted  an  extensive 
analysis  of  the  four  factor  test  before  denying 
MercExchange’s request for a permanent injunction.21  With 
respect  to  the  first  factor,  the  district  court  found  that 
MercExchange  had  failed  to  show  that  it  would  suffer 
irreparable  harm  absent  an  injunction  chiefly  because  of 
MercExchange’s lack of commercial activity and willingness 
to  license  its  patents.22  Noting  that  the  analysis  for  the 
“second factor of the four-factor test inevitably overlaps with 
that of the first,” the district court found that MercExchange 
had also failed to show that there was no adequate remedy 
at law.23  With respect to the third factor, the district court 
stated  that  there  was  uncertainty  around  (1) 
MercExchange’s ability to compete in the relevant market, 
(2) whether eBay had designed around the patent, and (3) 
whether the patent would survive reexamination.24 “With the 
future  so  speculative,”  the  district  court  found  that  the 
balance of the hardships did not favor either party.25  Finally, 
focusing on MercExchange’s willingness to receive monetary 
compensation  for  its  patent,  the  district  court  stated  that 
public interest weighed slightly against entry of a permanent 
injunction in this situation.26
The  impact  of  Supreme  Court’s  eBay  decision  is  that 
courts  must  now  determine  whether  to  grant  permanent 
injunctions in patent cases by using the four factor test used 
in other types of cases.  Moreover, the courts must avoid 
categorical rules and analyze each case individually.
Justice  Thomas’  majority  opinion  did  not  provide  any 
guidance on how those factors should be applied.  In fact, 
the  opinion  stated  that  “we  take  no  position  on  whether 
permanent injunctive relief should or should not issue in this 
particular case, or indeed in any number of other disputes 
20
2
. Id.  at 392 (citing Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag 
Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422–30 (1908)).
21
2
. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (eBay IV), 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 
(E.D. Va. 2007).
22
2
. Id. at  571–82,  590.   In  a  lengthy  decision,  the  district  court 
explained how numerous different facts impacted its analysis.   Only the 
most important ones that appeared to be dispositive are summarized here.
23
2
. Id. at 582–83.
24
2
. Id. at 583.
25
2
. Id. at 586–87.
26
2
. Id. at 587–88.
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arising under the Patent Act.”27  The only guidance provided 
in  eBay was  in  Justice  Kennedy’s  concurrence  joined  by 
Justices  Stevens,  Souter  and  Breyer.   This  concurrence 
suggested  that  courts  consider  “the  nature  of  the  patent 
being  enforced  and  the  economic  function  of  the  patent 
holder.”28  This  suggestion  provides a basis  for  looking at 
eBay’s four factor test with an economic perspective.
II APPLICATIONS OF THE FOUR FACTOR TEST
A review of the decisions applying the four eBay factors 
reveals  a  variety  of  trends,  difficult  fact  patterns,  and 
arguably flawed applications of  the  eBay  test.  This  Article 
selects three categories of fact patterns that have figured 
prominently  in  decisions  to  grant  or  deny  a  request  a 
permanent  injunction.   These  categories  are:  (1)  the 
existence of direct competition, (2) the institutional status of 
the  patent  holder,  and  (3)  the  value  that  the  patented 
technology contributes to the infringing product.  The first 
and  third  categories  have  figured  promi-nently  in  several 
decisions.   The second category has appeared in  a single 
case involving an important standard used by wireless local 
area  networks.   All  three  categories  can  be  better 
understood by analyzing  how the four  factor  test  applies, 
and  assessing  whether  relying  on  these  fact  patterns 
forwards the goals of the patent system.
A. DIRECT COMPETITION
One  category  of  fact  patterns  that  has  figured 
prominently  in  cases  applying  the  eBay factors—the 
existence, or lack of direct competition.  In many cases, this 
feature  appears  to  be  the  primary  focus  of  the  court’s 
inquiry.   This  Article  discusses  how courts  apply  the  four 
factor  test  to  the  existence  of  direct  competition,  lack  of 
direct competition and other variations.  It also explains why 
focusing on  the existence of  competition  correctly  applies 
the  four  factor  test  and forwards  the  goals  of  the  patent 
system.
The district courts repeatedly focused on the existence 
of direct competition between the two parties in determining 
whether  to  grant  a  permanent  injunction.   If  the  plaintiff 
27
2
. eBay III, 547 U.S. at 395.
28
2
. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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competes  directly  with  the  defendant  in  the market  for  a 
patented invention, that fact weighs in favor of granting a 
permanent injunction.   Starting with  TiVo Inc.  v.  EchoStar 
Communications  Corp.,29 several  decisions  rely  heavily  on 
the presence of direct competition.
In TiVo, the jury found that TiVo’s digital video recorder 
(DVR)  patent  claims  were  valid  and  that  the  defendant 
infringed a number of claims.30 TiVo filed motions for Entry of 
Judgment  and  Permanent  Injunction.   The  district  court 
focused on the first two  eBay factors.  Relying on the fact 
that  the parties were direct competitors,  the district  court 
found that TiVo had demonstrated that the absence of an 
injunction  would  cause it  irreparable  harm and that  there 
was no adequate remedy at law.31  Two findings magnified 
the importance of direct competition in  TiVo and made the 
case an even stronger candidate for an injunction.  First, the 
parties were competing in the nascent DVR market.  Thus, as 
part of its irreparable harm analysis, the court found that the 
plaintiff  was  losing  market  share  at  a  critical  time  in  the 
market’s  development.32  Second,  the  parties  agreed that 
DVR customers are “sticky customers,” that is, they tend to 
remain customers of the company from which they obtained 
their first DVR.33  As a result, the court concluded that “the 
full impact of Defendants’ infringement cannot be remedied 
by monetary damages.”34
The TiVo court also addressed the last two eBay factors. 
It  found that because the infringing products did not form 
the core of defendants’ business (satellite transmission), but 
did directly compete with the plaintiff’s primary product, the 
balance  of  hardships  also  weighed  in  favor  of  granting  a 
permanent injunction.35  Finally, the court stated the public 
interest would not be disservice by a permanent injunction 
because the products were not related to public health or 
any other key interest.36
29
2
. TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. 
Tex. 2006).
30
3
. Id. at 665.
31
3
. Id. at 669.
32
3
. Id. at 669–70.
33
3
. Id. at 670.
34
3
. Id.
35
3
. Id.
36
3
. Id.
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Subsequent  Eastern  District  of  Texas37 decisions  have 
cited to  Tivo for recognizing the “high value of intellectual 
property when it is asserted against a direct competitor in 
the plaintiff’s market.”38 These cases have not required any 
showing  that  the competitive problem was magnified (i.e. 
nascent  market  or  sticky  customers)  to  justify  granting  a 
permanent injunction.  Instead, they demonstrate that the 
Eastern  District  of  Texas  granted  permanent  injunctions 
several times in the presence of direct competition between 
the  parties.39  Moreover,  district  courts  from  other 
jurisdictions  have  also  relied  on  the  existence  of  direct 
competition in support of issuing permanent injunctions.40
However,  in  Praxair,  Inc.  v.  ATMI,  Inc.,  the  District  of 
Delaware denied a permanent injunction to a plaintiff in the 
presence of direct competition, because the plaintiff did not 
provide any details on either irreparable harm or the failure 
of monetary damages to adequately compensate it.41  Thus, 
the court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that 
it was entitled to an injunction.42  Praxair stands as a warning 
to plaintiffs that they may not be able to simply show direct 
competition  and  expect  that  an  injunction  will  follow. 
Furthermore, one district court denied an injunction despite 
the  plaintiff’s  claim  that  it  desired  to  compete  with  the 
defendant.  Interestingly, that was  MercExchange, L.L.C. v. 
eBay, Inc.,43 the case that that led to the eBay decision.  On 
remand,  the  district  court  denied  the  request  for  a 
37
3
. For a variety of reasons, the Eastern District of Texas has become 
one of the most popular forums for patent plaintiffs to file suit.  As a result, 
there are a disproportionate number of decisions regarding patent law from 
this  district.   William C.  Rooklidge  &  Renée L.  Stasio,  Venue in  Patent 
Litigation: The Unintended Consequences of Reform, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., 
Mar. 2008, at 2.
38
3
. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2-04-CV-32 
(TJW), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25948, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007);  see 
also  Visto Corp. v. Seven Network, Inc.,  No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 91453, at *14 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2006).
39
3
. O2 Micro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *9; MGM Well Servs. v. Mega Lift 
Sys., 505 F. Supp. 2d 359, 379 (E.D. Tex 2007); Brooktrout, Inc. v. Eicon 
Networks Corp., No. 2:03-CV-59, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43107, at *5 (E.D. 
Tex. June 14, 2007); Visto, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *14.
40
4
. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 477, 482 (W.D. 
Pa. 2007); Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007).
41
4
. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007).
42
4
. Id.
43
4
. eBay I, 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 722 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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permanent injunction.44
Several  variations  on  direct  competition  should  also 
weigh  in  favor  of  a  permanent injunction.    For  example, 
having  a  licensed  subsidiary  that  competes  with  the 
defendant would seem to provide the same justification for a 
permanent injunction as direct competition itself.45  At least 
one district court decision has relied on the existence of a 
licensee to a subsidiary, in granting a permanent injunction. 
In Novozymes A/S v. Genencor International, Inc.,46 the direct 
competition between the plaintiff’s subsidiary—and licensee
—and  the  defendant  was  the  chief  consideration  cited  in 
support of a permanent injunction. The court also found the 
balance  of  hardships  favored  a  permanent  injunction 
because the defendants had apparently pulled the infringing 
product  from  the  market.47  Finally,  the  court  noted  that 
there was no evidence that  an injunction would harm the 
public.48
Having an exclusive licensee should also weigh in favor 
of a permanent injunction.  However, in Voda v. Cordis Corp., 
the fact that plaintiff had granted an exclusive license was 
considered “irrelevant” because the licensee had not joined 
the action and was thus not a party to the lawsuit. 49  This 
analysis ignores the problem the plaintiff/licensor faces.  If 
the  plaintiff  receives  money  damages  instead  of  an 
injunction,  there  will  effectively  be  two  parties  using  the 
patented  technology,  the  exclusive  licensee  and  the 
defendant.   Thus, the exclusive licensee will no longer be 
“exclusive” and the licensee can justifiably expect some sort 
of compensation from the patent holder for the diminished 
value of the now non-exclusive license.  That request may be 
an  action  against  the  plaintiff  for  breach  of  contract, 
44
4
. eBay IV, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 591–92 (E.D. Va. 2007).
45
4
. In Paice II, the plaintiff argued that the denial of an injunction and 
the grant of an ongoing royalty inhibited the plaintiff’s ability to grant an 
exclusive license. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. (Paice II), 504 F.3d 1293, 
1314  n.14  (Fed.  Cir.  2007).  The  Federal  Circuit  found  that  there  was 
substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that the form of 
relief would not discourage other potential licensees.  Id.
46
4
. Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 613 (D. 
Del. 2007).
47
4
. Id.
48
4
. Id.
49
4
. Voda  v.  Cordis  Corp.,  No.  CIV-03-1512-L,  2006  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS 
63623, at *19 (W.D. Ok. Sept. 5, 2006).
BERNARD H. CHAO, "AFTER EBAY, INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE FOR PATENT REMEDIES" 9(2) 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543-572 (2008).
2008] CHANGING PATENT REMEDIES 553
rescission,  reformation  or  even unjust  enrichment.   These 
potential  problems  should  be  considered  as  important 
consideration in the irreparable harm/no adequate remedy 
prongs  of  the  eBay test.   The  Voda court  should  have 
considered these problems and the existence of an exclusive 
licensee  should  weigh  in  favor  of  granting  a  permanent 
injunction  regardless  of  whether  the  licensee  joins  in  the 
action.
While the cases discussed above demonstrate that the 
existence  of  direct  competition  generally  results  in  a 
permanent  injunction.  The  converse  is  also  true.  Lack  of 
direct  competition  generally  results  in  the  denial  of  a 
permanent injunction.50 There is  one notable exception.  In 
Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation 
v.  Buffalo Technology Inc.,  the court granted a permanent 
injunction  even  though  the  plaintiff,  Commonwealth 
Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) did not 
compete  with  the  defendant.51  The  court  issued  a 
permanent injunction relying chiefly on the fact that CSIRO is 
a research institution.52
Thus, the existence of direct competition appears to be a 
good predictor of whether a permanent injunction will issue. 
This  is  a  sensible  consideration  for  a  number  of  reasons. 
First,  the analysis  is  consistent with the basic  goal  of  the 
patent  system to  maximize  the public  good by promoting 
innovation  without  unduly  stifling  competition.53  When  a 
defendant does not compete with a plaintiff,  an injunction 
serves to deny the public access to a product that uses the 
patented technology.  By contrast, when competition exists, 
the public still has access to the products being enjoined.54 
The injunction merely serves to shift market share and the 
corresponding monetary rewards of the patented technology 
to the plaintiff.
Consideration  of  the  existence  or  absence  of  direct 
competition  appears  to  be  a  proper  application  of  eBay’s 
50
5
. See Paice II,  504 F.3d at 1314 n.14;  z4 Techs.,  Inc.  v.  Microsoft 
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
51
5
. Commonwealth Sci.  & Indus.  Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 
492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 603 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
52
5
. See infra text accompanying notes 60–71.
53
5
. See INNOVATION, supra note 8, at 8.
54
5
. Not  all  patented  inventions  provide  a  substantial  benefit  to  the 
public.  Courts can examine what interest the public has in the particular 
patented invention under the fourth eBay factor.
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four  factors.   When  competition  is  present,  monetary 
damages  generally  do  not  compensate  a  plaintiff  for  the 
value of future business goodwill (i.e. what is the value for 
being known as the next Apple Computer) that it  receives 
from increasing market share.  In contrast, when there is no 
competition, the plaintiff does not suffer irreparable harm in 
the absence of  an injunction  because it  is  not  losing  any 
market share.  Moreover, monetary damages are adequate 
because  those  are  the  only  compensation  that  such  a 
plaintiff can obtain; an injunction merely serves to increase 
the settlement value of a monetary damages amount.  The 
balance  of  hardships  also  weighs  in  favor  of  denying 
injunctive relief in the absence of direct competition.  The 
defendant will clearly be harmed by the inability to offer its 
product or services, but there is no corresponding hardship 
suffered by the patent holder.  Finally, the public has at least 
some interest in having the patented technology available.
Third, the test is relatively straightforward and not easily 
subject to manipulation.  The existence of competition in the 
market is readily discernable.  Either the parties are selling 
products that compete or they are not.  Of course there will 
be  a  few cases  that  are  at  the  margin.   For  example,  in 
Verizon Services, the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiff’s 
evidence of lost sales, price erosion and lost opportunities to 
sell other services was sufficient to show irreparable harm, 
and the Court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant a 
permanent injunction.55  However, neither the district court 
nor the Federal  Circuit  examined whether the competition 
existed in services that used the patented technology.
In  Verizon,  Verizon  asserted  patents  that  claimed 
technology  useful  for  internet  telephony.56  Defendant 
Vonage  provides  telephone  services  using  Voice  over  IP 
(VoIP),  a  technology that  uses  the  internet  to  carry  voice 
signals,  while  Verizon  is  primarily  known  for  traditional 
landline and wireless telephones.57  When the Federal Circuit 
cited to lost sales and price erosion, it was unclear whether 
55
5
. Verizon Servs. Corp v. Vonage Holding Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1311 
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
56
5
. Id. at 1298.
57
5
. A search of the Verizon website, http://www22.verizon.com, reveals 
that Verizon does have a VoIP service that it calls VoiceWing broadband 
phone service.  However, the information about VoiceWing is not displayed 
nearly  as  prominently  as  its  other  phone  services.  See Verizon, 
http://www22. verizon.com (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
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the Federal Circuit was pointing to Vonage products that use 
its  patented  technology  or  not.   Presumably,  the  lost 
opportunities to sell other services did not use the patented 
technology.  It is at least possible that Verizon was using its 
patents to safeguard its traditional telephone service against 
the development of internet telephony.  If internet telephony 
is  actually  superior  to  traditional  landline  technology,  the 
public may have been disserved by an injunction even in the 
presence of direct competition.  This issue does not appear 
to  have  been  reviewed  by  the  courts  in  the  Verizon 
decisions.
In the future, courts may wish to examine what kind of 
competition the plaintiff  identifies in support of its request 
for  an  injunction.    The  public  has  an  interest  in  having 
access to new patented technology  If the patent holder is 
not offering products using its own patents, there may be 
less reason for the court to grant the injunction.  To be sure, 
any kind of competition may tend to show irreparable harm, 
but in some cases the public interest in access to the most 
recent  technology,  and  presumably  the  best  technology, 
may be equally important.
Thus, direct competition should be an important, but not 
dispositive consideration.  The alternative would violate the 
Supreme Court’s  prohibition  in  eBay on  broad  categorical 
rules.   There  are  still  other  circumstances  where  no 
injunction  should  issue  even  when  the  plaintiff  and 
defendant  are  direct  competitors—for  example,  when  the 
patent covers a relatively unimportant feature of a product, 
but the costs of a design-around are high.58
58
5
. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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B. RESEARCH INSTITUTION OR TROLL
A second category  of  fact  patterns  is  the  institutional 
status of the plaintiff (e.g. research institution or troll).  One 
recent  district  court  case  granted  an  injunction  based 
primarily  on the plaintiff’s  status as a research institution. 
This  case  has  been  watched  carefully  because  of  the 
powerful precedent it may set and because the plaintiff has 
argued that its patent covers all products that practice the 
IEEE 802.11a and g standards.59  This section criticizes the 
decision as an incorrect application of  the four factor test 
and argues that focusing on the institutional  status of the 
plaintiff does not forward the goals of the patent system.
In  Commonwealth  Scientific  &  Industrial  Research 
Organisation  (CSIRO)  v.  Buffalo,60 the  plaintiff  was  the 
principal  scientific  research  organization  of  the  Australian 
Federal  Government.61 It  had  developed  and  patented  a 
wireless local area network (WLAN) technology.  CSIRO sued 
the Buffalo defendants claiming that the defendants’ WLAN 
products infringed CSIRO’s WLAN patent.  The district court 
granted  CSIRO’s  summary  judgment on both  infringement 
and validity and infringement.
Before  damages  were  determined,  the  district  court 
granted CSIRO’s motion for permanent injunction using the 
four factor test required by eBay.  In analyzing these factors, 
the court heavily relied on the plaintiff’s status as a research 
organization.   The court  determined that  CSIRO would be 
irreparably harmed in two ways if an injunction did not issue. 
First,  having  its  patent  challenged  “impugns  CSIRO’s 
reputation as a leading scientific research entity.”62  Second, 
patent challenges divert money from research and delays in 
research are likely to result in “CSIRO being pushed out of 
valuable  fields  as  other  research  groups  achieve  critical 
intellectual  property  positions.”63  This  analysis  is  suspect 
because  the  two  cited  harms  are  related  to  the  cost  of 
litigation,  and  not  to  the  failure  to  issue  an  injunction.64 
59
5
. Practically  all  wireless  local  area  networks  currently  use  this 
standard.
60
6
. 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
61
6
. Id. at 601.
62
6
. Id. at 604.
63
6
. Id.
64
6
. Id.  The  court  also  analyzed  the  adequacy  of  damages,  but  this 
analysis was not based on the fact that CSIRO was a research institution. 
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Moreover,  the  Supreme  Court  and  Federal  Circuit  have 
previously  discussed  the  public’s  strong  public  interest  in 
“resolving questions of patent invalidity”65 and the Federal 
Circuit held that lost research opportunities do not constitute 
irreparable harm.66  Nonetheless, this discussion shows that 
CSIRO’s  status  as  a  research  institution  was  considered 
throughout the district court’s analysis.
The  district  court  also  relied  on  CSIRO’s  status  as  a 
research  institution  to  find  that  the  balance  of  hardships 
favored granting an injunction.67  The court stated that the 
Buffalo  defendants’  hardship  was “purely  monetary.”68  In 
contrast,  the  court  found  that  the  failure  to  issue  an 
injunction  would  injure  CSIRO  and  “negatively  impact 
CSIRO's research and development efforts and its ability to 
bring new technologies into fruition.”69  As a result, the court 
found  that  the  balance  of  hardships  favored  issuing  an 
injunction.
Finally, the court found that the public had an interest in 
issuing an injunction. The court started with the premise that 
the public has an interest in a strong patent system.70  The 
court  then  discussed  at  some  length  the  “enormous 
benefits” that research institutions have produced.71  More 
specifically,  the  court  stated  that  the  public  interest  is 
“advanced  by  encouraging  investment  by  research 
organizations into future technologies and serves to promote 
the progress of science and the useful arts.”72  As a result, 
Commonwealth  Scientific appears  to  stand  for  the 
proposition  that  the  public  has  a  greater  interest  in 
protecting  the  patent  rights  of  research  institutions  than 
other  entities,  and  that  permanent  injunctions  should  be 
awarded to these types of entities.
Id. at 606.
65
6
. Cardinal  Chem.  Co.  v.  Morton  Int’l,  508  U.S.  83,  100  (1993); 
Blonder-Tongue Labs.,  Inc. v. Univ. of Ill.  Found., 402 U.S. 313,  344–46 
(1971);  see  also  Smithkline  Beecham Corp.  v.  Apotex.  Corp.,  403  F.3d 
1331, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
66
6
. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Am. Cynamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 
1996).
67
6
. Commonwealth, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 606–07.
68
6
. Id. at 606.
69
6
. Id.
70
7
. Id. at 607.
71
7
. Id.
72
7
. Id.
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The  Commonwealth  Scientific analysis  is  both  a 
questionable application of the eBay factors and bad policy. 
First, the irreparable harm/inadequate remedy factors do not 
favor non-practicing research institutions.  An injunction only 
helps  a  non-practicing entity  by increasing the settlement 
value  of  its  patent.   By  definition,  this  harm  can  be 
adequately addressed through monetary damages.
Moreover, there is no reason to distinguish a research 
institution  from  other  non-practicing  entities.   The  only 
rationale  found  in  Commonwealth  Scientific  is  that  public 
interest favors research institutions because of the benefit 
they provide society—future research.  However, it is unclear 
whether  public  research  institutions  actually  are  more 
efficient  at  promoting  technology.73  There  is  at  least  a 
reasonable  argument  that  encouraging  entrepreneurial 
environments like that found in Silicon Valley is the best way 
to encourage rapid technological development.
Finally, if being a public research institution were to be 
widely accepted as an appropriate consideration under eBay, 
patent  holders  could  game  the  system  by  becoming  or 
sponsoring research institutions.  Indeed, many established 
patent holders have established research foundations (e.g., 
the Lemelson Foundation).74  Taken to the extreme, patent 
holders could commit a particular portion of any recovery to 
charitable institutions, thereby increasing the likelihood of an 
injunction and the value of their patents.  Still  further, the 
money  due to  the  charitable  institution  may  only  be  due 
upon  the  issuance  of  an  injunction.75  Surely  it  would  be 
73
7
. Mark A.  Lemley,  Are Universities Patent Trolls?, (Stanford Pub. L. 
Working  Paper  No.  980776)  8–13  (2006),  available  at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=980776.
74
7
. Jerome Lemelson had frequently litigated his patents and had been 
accused  of  being  a  “patent  troll.”   He  also  established  the  Lemelson 
Foundation to  support  inventors  and  entrepreneurs.   Who We Are:  The 
Lemelson  Foundation,  http://web.mit.edu/invent/w-foundation.html  (last 
visited  Mar.  23,  2008).   Some  might  suggest  that  the  foundation  was 
established to give him credibility as Lemeslon’s patents were litigated. 
This  article  takes  no  position  on  why  the  Lemelson  Foundation  was 
established.  It merely points to the possibility that such tactics are used.
75
7
. The press release for the settlement of  Verizon Services Corp. v. 
Vonage  Holding  Corp., 503  F.3d  1295  (Fed.  Cir.  2007)  indicates  that 
Vonage will have to pay $2.5 million to charity if its appeal fails or if a stay 
of  Verizon’s  injunction  is  lifted.   Press  Release,  Vonage,  Vonage  and 
Verizon  Settle  Patent  Dispute  (Oct.  25,  2007),  available  at 
http://pr.vonage.com/  releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=271491.  Is  this  an 
example of  corporate gener-osity or  of  a plaintiff  trying to manufacture 
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unfair  to  the  defendants  and  unwise  for  courts  to  allow 
patent holders to manufacture a situation that results in a 
permanent injunction.
C. THE PATENTED INVENTION’S RELATION TO THE INFRINGING DEVICE
A third category of fact patterns that has figured in some 
decisions  applying  the  four  factor  test  is  the  relative 
contribution  the  patented  invention  has  to  the  infringing 
device.  This section describes how courts have analyzed the 
relative  contribution  a  patented  invention  makes  to  the 
infringing device when applying the four factor  test.   This 
Article  suggests  that  this  should  be  an  important 
consideration  especially  when  viewed  from  an  economic 
perspective.  Courts should be wary of granting a permanent 
injunction for a patent that contributes little to the infringing 
device  because  that  can  result  in  over  compensation. 
However, the converse is not true.  Courts should be not be 
concerned  that  denying  a  permanent  injunction  for  a 
patented  invention  that  contributes  substantially  to  the 
infringing device will result in under compensation.  Finally, 
this Article explains how the courts can fine tune injunctions 
to avoid both over and under compensation.
A  permanent  injunction  is  a  powerful  remedy  that 
rewards  patent  holders.   However,  when  issued  without 
examining the particular facts of the case, an injunction can 
overcompensate a patent holder for its relative contribution. 
Justice  Kennedy recognized this  problem when he warned 
that an injunction “can be employed as a bargaining tool to 
charge  exorbitant  fees  to  companies  that  seek  to  buy 
licenses to practice the patent.”76
Courts  must  examine the relationship  of  the patented 
invention to the infringing product and determine whether 
an injunction  is  appropriate.   This  is  precisely  the kind of 
analysis Justice Kennedy suggested in his concurrence when 
he stated:
When  the  patented  invention  is  but  a  small  component  of  the 
product  the  companies  seek  to  produce  and  the  threat  of  an 
injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, 
legal  damages  may  well  be  sufficient  to  compensate  for  the 
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.77
“public interest” in support of an injunction?
76
7
. eBay III, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
77
7
. Id. at 396–97.
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Recast in economic terms, one important consideration 
is whether the injunction would properly reward the patent 
holder  for  the  patent’s  technical  contribution  without 
overcompensating the patent holder.
1. Guarding Against Overcompensation
An example of the overcompensation issue occurred in 
z4  Technologies,  Inc.  v.  Microsoft  Corp.78  In  z4,  the  jury 
found that Microsoft’s Office and Windows products infringed 
two patents.79  The patents disclose methods of limiting the 
unauthorized  use  of  computer  software,  referred  to  as 
product activation.80  This feature was only a small part of 
the infringing products.81
The plaintiff asked the court to enjoin current Windows 
XP and Office products and to deactivate servers that control 
product activation for the infringing products.82  The district 
court refused to issue a permanent injunction.83  The district 
court first noted that Microsoft’s  products do not compete 
with  z4’s.84  However,  relying  on  Justice  Kennedy’s 
concurrence, the court also discussed why money damages 
were  adequate  in  view  of  the  relationship  between  the 
patented invention and the infringing product.  Specifically, 
the court stated:
Here, product activation is a very small component of the Microsoft 
Windows  and  Office  software  products  that  the  jury  found  to 
infringe z4's patents. The infringing product activation component 
of the software is in no way related to the core functionality for 
which the software is purchased by consumers.85
The facts show that the value of the patented invention 
to the accused Microsoft product was relatively small.86  The 
78
7
. 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
79 . Id. at 438.
80
8
. Id.
81 . Id. at 440.
82 . Id. at 439.
83 . Id. at 444.
84 . Id. at 440 (“There is no logical reason that a potential consumer or 
licensee  of  z4’s  technology  would  have  dissuaded  from  purchasing  or 
licensing z4’s product activation technology for use in  its own software 
due to Microsoft’s infringement.”).
85 . Id. at 441.
86 . The concept of “relatively small” should be distinguished from no 
value. The jury did award the plaintiff $115 million for past infringement. 
Presumably,  this  is  a  small  portion  of  Microsoft’s  sales  of  these  two 
incredibly successful software products. Id. at 438.
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invention was clearly not vital to the products’ core function 
because  Microsoft  was  already  eliminating  the  patented 
invention  from  future  versions  of  Windows  and  Office  in 
2007.   However,  the  cost  of  eliminating  the  patented 
technology from existing products was extremely high.   If 
Microsoft were forced to redesign current versions, it would 
have had to re-release 450 separate variations of Office in 
37  different  languages  and  600  different  variations  in  40 
languages.87  If its product activation servers were turned off, 
Microsoft  argued  that  the  market  would  be  flooded  with 
pirated  software.88  Based  on  these  findings,  the  district 
court denied the injunction.
This result was consistent with the goals underlying the 
patent system because it based the plaintiff’s reward on the 
relative  contribution  of  the  patented  invention  to  the 
infringing product.  Without an injunction, z4 had only one 
significant  bargaining chip to offer  Microsoft  in settlement 
negotiations—the  value  of  its  patented  product  activation 
feature in both current and future generations of Windows 
and Office.  To keep the patented technology in the current 
product,  Microsoft  had  to  continue  to  pay  a  reasonable 
royalty  based  on  the  jury’s  damage  reward.89  For  future 
products,  the parties could negotiate a rate  based on the 
value that the patented invention actually contributes to the 
products, or Microsoft could simply eliminate the feature.
If an injunction had issued, however, z4 would have an 
additional  lever.  It  could force Microsoft  to incur expenses 
associated with eliminating the patented technology from its 
current  products.  The  former  consideration  seems  to  be 
precisely the type of compensation that the patent system 
should provide z4—allowing parties to negotiate the value of 
particular technology. However, the cost savings associated 
with a design around has no relationship to the value that 
the patented invention contributes to a product.  It is simply 
the unfortunate side effect of resolving patent disputes after 
products are designed and sold.  By denying z4’s request for 
an injunction, the court applied the eBay factors in a manner 
that  eliminated the cost  of  a design around as  a lever  in 
settlement negotiations.
The z4 case did not present the most challenging set of 
87
8
. Id. at 442.
88
8
. Id. at 443.
89
8
. Id.
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facts  because  the  plaintiff,  z4,  did  not  compete  with 
Microsoft.   As  a  result,  that  consideration  also  weighed 
heavily in denying the request for a permanent injunction. 
The more interesting case will be one in which the parties 
are: (1) direct competitors, (2) the patented technology is an 
insignificant part of the infringing device, and (3) the cost of 
designing around or eliminating the patented technology is 
extremely  high.   This  scenario  could  easily  occur  in  the 
semiconductor  industry  where  the  cost  of  making  an 
insignificant change to the design of a semiconductor chip 
can be extremely high.  When the patented technology is 
sufficiently insignificant and the redesign cost is sufficiently 
high, an injunction should be denied even in the presence of 
direct  competition.   From a patent  policy perspective this 
makes sense because the public does not have an interest in 
incentivizing  competitors  to  play  “gotcha”  by  expending 
resources to enforce patents with minimal value.
2. Guarding Against Under Compensation?
Both Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in  eBay and the  z4 
case relate  to  the  problem of  overcompensating a patent 
holder for the contribution the patented technology makes to 
an  infringing  device  by  granting  a  permanent  injunction. 
However, if an economic-based approach is correct, then the 
opposite problem is at least theoretically possible.  The court 
in  Commonwealth Scientific tried to extend the law in this 
direction by suggesting that the denial of an injunction would 
fail to fully compensate the patent holder.   In analyzing the 
adequacy of damages, the district court stated that:
Since  [defendant’s]  infringement  relates  to  the  essence  of  the 
technology  and  is  not  a  “small  component”  of  [defendant’s] 
infringing  products,  monetary  damages  are  less  adequate  in 
compensating [plaintiff] for [defendant’s] future infringement.90
Similarly,  the  District  of  Delaware  in  IMX  Inc.  v. 
LendingTree  LLC also  indicated  that  when  infringement  is 
not limited to a minor component, irreparable harm is more 
likely to be found.91  These cases reflect a misunderstanding 
of  the  overcompensation  problem.  Injunctions  result  in 
overcompen-sation when the costs of designing around the 
90
9
. Commonwealth Sci.  & Indus.  Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 
492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 606 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
91
9
. IMX Inc. v. LendingTree L.L.C., 469 F. Supp. 2d. 203, 225 (D. Del. 
2007).
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patented invention are significant compared to the value of 
the patented invention itself.92  In those cases, granting a 
permanent  injunction  provides  the  patent  holder  with  a 
windfall  that  is  unrelated  to  the  value  of  the  patented 
invention.  That windfall is the ability of the patent holder to 
force the infringer to redesign its products.  The injunction 
allows the patent holder to recover a substantial portion of 
the costs associated with the redesign in any settlement.
The denial of a permanent injunction, however, does not 
suffer from a similar gap between what the compensation a 
patent holder should and does receive.  In other words, the 
infringer has no lever that allows it to pay less than the value 
the patented invention contributes to the infringing product. 
Even when an injunction is denied, courts can continue to 
award  an  ongoing  royalty,  a  compulsory  license  only 
available to the losing party,93 or the patent holder can bring 
a later suit for that infringement.  One way or another, these 
remedies should compensate the patent holder for the value 
that  the  patented  invention  contributes  to  the  infringing 
product.  The parameters of an ongoing royalty have not yet 
been determined.  To date some courts have based the rate 
on the jury’s award of past damages.94  Therefore, the fact 
that  the  patented  invention  is  a  large  or  important 
component  of  the  infringing  product  should  not  be  given 
substantial  weight  when  determining  whether  to  grant  a 
permanent injunction.
3. Tailoring the Injunction
The z4 and Commonwealth Scientific decisions show how 
courts are considering the relationship between the patented 
invention and the infringing product in determining whether 
to issue a permanent injunction.  However, the granting or 
92
9
. The value of the patented invention can be thought of as the value 
the  patented  invention  adds  to  the  product  if  it  were  designed  from 
scratch.
93
9
. Paice LLC v.  Toyota Motor Corp.,  504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 
2007).
94
9
. Voda  v.  Cordis  Corp.,  No.  CIV-03-1512-L,  2006  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS 
63623, at *18 (W.D. Ok. Sept. 5, 2006); Finisar Corp. v. DirectTV Group, 
Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006);  but see 
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., SACV 05-467-JVS(RNBx), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 86627 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2007) (for infringement that would take 
place during a sunset period—that is until a permanent injunction went into 
effect—the  court  trebled  the  jury  determined  royalty  rate  for  past 
infringement).
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denying  of  a  permanent  injunction  can  be  a  rather  blunt 
instrument.  The Federal Circuit has recently suggested that 
when  considering  the  eBay factors,  courts  can  craft  the 
injunction to reflect the individual circumstances of the case. 
In  Verizon  Services  Corp.  v.  Vonage  Holding  Corp.,  the 
defendant was found to have infringed valid patents and the 
district  court  granted  an  injunction.95 The  Federal  Circuit 
affirmed  the  injunction,  but  in  a  footnote,  the  court 
suggested that as part of the balance of hardships analysis, 
the district court should have considered allowing time for 
Vonage to implement a workaround to avoid infringement:
One factor that is relevant to the balance of the hardships required 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay was not considered by the 
district  court,  namely  whether  the  district  court  should  have 
allowed  time  for  [defendant]  to  implement  a  workaround  that 
would avoid continued infringement of the ’574 and ’711 patents 
before issuing its injunction. [Plaintiff] had a cognizable interest in 
obtaining an injunction to put an end to infringement of its patents; 
it  did  not  have  a  cognizable  interest  in  putting  Vonage  out  of 
business.96
The Federal Circuit made its suggestion in the context of 
analyzing  the  balance  of  hardships,  but  it  did  not  cite  to 
Justice Kennedy’s eBay concurrence.  However, the proposed 
remedy  fits  extremely  well  within  the  framework  he 
suggested.   For  example,  the design around cost  may be 
extremely  high  if  the  injunction  requires  immediate 
implementation.  However, it may be quite reasonable given 
a longer time frame.  As a result, as the design around costs 
decrease,  any  overcompensation  that  a  patent  holder 
receives for its contribution to the infringing products grows 
correspondingly smaller.
This type of remedy mirrors the outcome of the z4 case. 
Although no injunction was issued, Microsoft was not going 
to  include  the  patented  invention  in  its  next  generation 
products.   Thus,  the  parties’  bargaining  position  probably 
would have not changed substantially if the district court had 
granted an injunction that permitted Microsoft sufficient time 
to redesign it products.97
95
9
. Verizon Servs. Corp v. Vonage Holding Corp., 503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007)
96
9
. Id. at 1311 n.12.
97
9
. This  may  be  an  oversimplification  because  Microsoft  may  have 
difficulty  both  complying  with  an  injunction  and  supporting  earlier 
infringing products.
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Although Verizon suggests that the delayed injunction is 
an appropriate way to account for the balance of hardships, 
it  also  serves  to  mitigate  problems  associated  with 
overcompensating  a  patent  holder  for  many  of  the  same 
reasons related to the balance of hardship analysis.  Thus, 
courts can be expected to delay injunctions when to do so 
would further satisfy the eBay factors.  Recently, the court in 
Broadcom  Corp.  v.  Qualcomm,98 took  this  approach  by 
granting the defendant a 20 month sunset provision in which 
it  was allowed to continue to sell  some specific  infringing 
devices.99
Delaying injunctions may be just one way to tailor  an 
injunction.  In some cases, the design around costs for some 
products may be higher than others.  For example, in the z4 
case,  the  cost  associated  with  eliminating  the  patented 
invention  from  Windows  may  be  quite  different  from 
redesigning Office. This suggests that courts should at least 
consider  granting  an  injunction  against  some—but  not 
necessarily  all—infringing  products  in  the  same  case. 
Indeed,  the  Broadcom case  involved  several  different 
patents  and the  court’s  decision  applied  the  eBay factors 
separately for different patents.100
III AFTER AN INJUNCTION IS DENIED, ARE 
PLAINTIFFS LEFT WITH AN ONGOING ROYALTY?
Since permanent injunctions were almost always granted 
to prevailing patents plaintiffs before  eBay, courts are now 
confronted  with  a  new  set  of  issues—what  to  do  with 
infringing  defendants  in  the  absence  of  a  permanent 
injunction?  There appears to be two primary options.  The 
courts  could  impose  a  compulsory  license  or  “ongoing 
royalty”101 on the defendant and force it to pay the patent 
98
9
. Broadcom, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86627.
99
9
. The scope of  permitted sales  was defined by infringing products 
which were in fact sold on or before May 29, 2007 (the date of the jury 
verdict) to the prior or existing customers for those products on that date. 
Id. at *13, *18.
100
1
. Id.
101
1
. In  Paice  II the  Federal  Circuit  distinguished  the  term  “ongoing 
royalty” from  “compulsory license.”  Paice II,  504 F.3d 1293, 1313 n.13 
(Fed.  Cir.  2007)  (emphasis  in  original).  The  decision  states  that  a 
compulsory license  “implies  that  anyone who meets  certain criteria has 
congressional authority to use that which is licensed.”  Id. In contrast, an 
ongoing royalty “is limited to one particular set of defendants.”  Id..
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holder  for  continued  infringement.   Alternatively,  a  court 
could “do nothing,” thereby forcing the defendant to choose 
between stopping infringement, obtaining a license or risk a 
future verdict of willful infringement. 
Section  III  explores  the  infringement  remedies  that 
courts should, and are granting for future infringements now 
that  permanent  injunctions  are  not  always  available.   In 
particular, Section III A describes the ongoing royalty.  This 
Article  argues  that  this  remedy  has  no  basis  in  case  or 
statutory law.   Section III B explains that the courts do not 
need to  replace  the  permanent  injunction.   They can “do 
nothing” because the existing doctrine of willful infringement 
already  adequately  safeguards  the  patent  holder  against 
future infringement by the losing defendant.
A. AN ONGOING ROYALTY, THE ALTERNATIVE TO A PERMANENT INJUNCTION.
To date, several courts have imposed what the Federal 
Circuit in Paice LLC  v. Toyota Motor Corp. calls an “ongoing 
royalty.”102  The Federal Circuit recently addressed the issue 
of whether courts have the authority to grant this relief.  In 
Paice, the plaintiff sued Toyota on three patents related to 
drive-trains for hybrid electric vehicles.  The jury eventually 
returned  a  verdict  of  infringement  under  the  doctrine  of 
equivalents  on  one  of  the  patents,  and  awarded 
$4,269,950.00 to Paice as a reasonable royalty.103  After an 
analysis of the four factor test, the district court denied the 
plaintiff’s  request  for  a  permanent  injunction  and  instead 
imposed  an  ongoing  royalty.   Specifically,  Toyota  was 
ordered to pay an “ongoing royalty of $ 25.00 per infringing 
[vehicle].”104
Paice appealed the decision arguing, inter alia, that the 
district  court did not have the statutory authority to issue 
this order and that Paice was denied its Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial to establish the ongoing royalty rate.  The 
Federal Circuit looked to 35 U.S.C. § 283 which states:
The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may 
grant  injunctions  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  equity  to 
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms 
102
1
. Id.
103
1
. Paice  LLC v.  Toyota  Motor  Corp.  (Paice  I),   No.  2:04-CV-211-DF, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600 (E.D. Tex Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d in part vacated 
in part, Paice II, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
104
1
. Paice II, 504 F.3d at 1313–14.
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as the court deems reasonable.105
The Federal Circuit  framed the issue by stating that it 
must  determine  “whether  an  order  permitting  use  of  a 
patented  invention  in  exchange  for  a  royalty  is  properly 
characterized  as  preventing  the  violation  of  the  rights 
secured  by  the  patent.”106 However,  after  setting  up  a 
question  of  statutory  construction,  the  Federal  Circuit 
sidestepped it by merely citing to a patent case107 and an 
antirust case108 that granted ongoing royalties.  Neither case 
discussed  35  U.S.C.  §  283.   In  Shatterproof  Glass,  the 
defendant  did  not  object  to  the  principal  of  an  ongoing 
royalty;  instead  the  appeal  challenged  the  amount. 
Therefore, the opinion never addressed whether courts have 
the authority to order an ongoing royalty in a patent case, 
nor did it discuss or cite to 35 U.S.C. § 283.  U.S. v Glaxo is 
even  further  afield  because  the  case  concerned  antitrust 
remedies.  It also never mentioned 35 U.S.C. § 283.
Relying  on  this  rather  thin  support,  Paice  found  that 
courts  have  the  authority  to  grant  on-going  royalties  in 
patent cases.  However, the Federal Circuit suggested that 
court should not impose “such relief as a matter of course 
whenever  a  permanent  injunction  is  not  imposed.”109 
Instead, the district court may wish to allow the parties to 
negotiate a license.  If that attempt fails, “the district court 
could step in to assess a reasonable royalty in light of the 
ongoing infringement.”110
Even before Paice, several district courts had chosen the 
same remedy and granted an ongoing royalty after denying 
a request for permanent injunction.  For example in Voda, 
the district court ordered the defendant to make quarterly 
reports on post-verdict infringing sales, presumably to pay 
the royalty rate assessed by the jury.111  Similarly, in Finisar 
105
1
. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
106
1
. Paice II, 504 F.3d at 1314.
107
1
. Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 
628 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
108
1
. United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59 (1973).
109
1
. Paice II, 504 F.3d 1293, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
110
1
. Id.
111
1
. Voda  v.  Cordis  Corp.,  No.  CIV-03-1512-L,  2006  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS 
63623, at *20 (W.D. Ok. Sept. 5, 2006).  Although the plaintiff asked the 
court to order quarterly reports so that the defendant could pay the royalty 
rate  assessed  by the  jury,  the decision  never  specifically  discusses  the 
royalty rate.  Based on the court’s statement that post-verdict damages 
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the court denied the motion for a permanent injunction but 
ordered the defendants to pay $1.60 per unit for the life of 
the plaintiff’s  patent.112  However,  these decisions did  not 
address whether courts have the authority to grant ongoing 
royalties.
Although  the  courts  have  either  ignored  or  failed  to 
satisfactorily explain why they have the authority to grant 
ongoing  royalties,  they  may  believe  that  they  have  no 
alternative after the eBay decision.  After all, eBay envisions 
successful patent plaintiffs that are not granted a permanent 
injunction.  Given that situation, courts may believe that the 
only alternative to allowing post verdict infringement is to 
force the defendant to pay some form of ongoing royalty. 
With that dilemma in mind, the Paice court appears to have 
implicitly answered the § 283 issue it presented with a yes: 
an order permitting use of a patented invention in exchange 
for  a  royalty  is  properly  characterized  as  preventing  the 
violation of the rights secured by the patent.
While this analysis may satisfy the second part of § 283, 
it  ignores  the  first  phrase.  The  first  phrase  limits  the 
authority  the  statute  grants  to  injunctions:   “The  several 
courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant 
injunctions . . . to prevent the violation of any right secured 
by patent . . . .”113   Indeed, the statute is titled “Injunctions” 
and the statute does not discuss any other kind of relief.114 
The  courts  could  characterize  an  ongoing  royalty  as  a 
conditional  injunction  that  enjoins  the  defendant  from 
infringing unless it pays the royalty prescribed by the court. 
However,  the courts  do not  need to stretch §  283 in  this 
manner to prevent post filing infringement.
B. A THIRD WAY: DO NOTHING.
The courts could  do nothing.   Doing nothing does not 
necessarily  allow  a  defendant  to  continuing  infringing  a 
patent.   Once  a  permanent  injunction  is  denied,  doing 
nothing may actually serve as a greater deterrent to future 
consisted of “simple mathematical calculations,” it appears that the court 
intended to use the royalty rate determined by the jury.  Id.
112
1
. Finisar Corp. v. DirectTV Group, No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 76380, at *5 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006).
113
1
. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000) (emphasis added).
114
1
. The statute could have allowed the courts to grant “relief” like 35 
U.S.C. § 291, which discusses interfering patents.
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infringement  than  imposing  an  ongoing  royalty.   If  the 
defendant continues to infringe after losing a first lawsuit, a 
subsequent lawsuit carries the very real risk of a finding of 
willful infringement that would result in enhanced damages 
and attorneys fees.  This may describe the method used in 
Saffran v. Boston Scientific Corp.115  After a jury verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff, Judge Ward issued an order sua sponte 
“severing  plaintiff’s  continuing  causes  of  action  for  future 
royalties.”116  The  order  does  not  specify  whether  future 
royalties will be at the same rate calculated by the jury for 
past damages or be enhanced for willful infringement.
Section 284 of the Patent Act states that a court “may 
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or 
assessed.”117 Although  the  statute  does  not  provide  a 
standard  for  determining  when  to  enhance  damages,  the 
Federal  Circuit  has  long  held  that  enhancing  damages 
requires  a  showing of  willful  infringement.118  To  establish 
willful  infringement  “a  patentee  must  show  by  clear  and 
convincing  evidence  that  the  infringer  acted  despite  an 
objectively  high  likelihood  that  his  actions  constituted 
infringement  of  a  valid  patent.”119  Once  that  standard  is 
satisfied,  “the  patentee  must  also  demonstrate  that  this 
objectively-defined  risk  (determined  by  the  record  of  the 
infringement proceedings) was either known or so obvious 
that it should have been known to the accused infringer.120
A  plaintiff  can  easily  satisfy  this  standard  if  the 
defendant continues to infringe after losing a first lawsuit. 
Having already lost the first lawsuit, there is no doubt that 
the infringer  was  aware  of  the  patent  and aware  that  he 
would  lose  the  second  lawsuit.   Indeed,  claim  preclusion 
should prevent the defendant from re-litigating infringement 
and invalidity121 and the case should merely revolve around 
115
1
. Saffran v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 2-05-CV-547, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 76135 (E.D. Tex Feb. 14, 2008).
116
1
. Saffran v. Boston Scientific Corp.,  No. 2-05-CV-547, at 1 (E.D. Tex. 
Feb.  14,  2008)  (order  severing  plaintiff’s  causes  of  action  for  future 
royalties).
117
1
. 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (2006).
118
1
. In re Seagate Technology LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed Cir. 2007) 
(en banc) (citing Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithography 
Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
119
1
. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370.
120
1
. Id.
121
1
. See Hallco Mfg. Co. v. Foster, 256 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
BERNARD H. CHAO, "AFTER EBAY, INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE FOR PATENT REMEDIES" 9(2) 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543-572 (2008).
570 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:2
damages and willfulness.  Similarly, there is a real likelihood 
that a second case would be considered “exceptional” under 
35  U.S.C.  §  284.   In  that  case,  the  court  could  award 
attorneys fees to the plaintiff as well.
Thus, in the absence of a permanent injunction, doing 
nothing may actually provide a greater deterrence than an 
ongoing royalty based on the jury award.122  The defendant 
would face the choice of: (1) avoiding infringement either by 
completely halting the infringing activity or redesigning its 
product/service,  (2)  negotiating  a  license,  or  (3)  risking  a 
second lawsuit  that  will  likely  result  in  a finding  of  willful 
infringement  and  the  risk  of  enhanced  damages  and 
attorneys fees.
Many plaintiffs would prefer this situation to receiving an 
ongoing royalty.  As a result, plaintiffs that do satisfy  eBay 
may consider doing nothing as well.  These plaintiffs can ask 
for  past  damages  and  forego  seeking  a  permanent 
injunction.   If  the  defendant  continues  to  infringe  after 
judgment, the plaintiff could recover treble damages instead 
of  an  ongoing  royalty  that  the  plaintiff  may  view  as 
insufficient.
The court in Broadcom recently used a similar approach 
to calculate the royalty  rate for a sunset period—the time 
between the jury  verdict  and the court  ordered injunction 
taking effect.123  The court reasoned that any infringement 
after a jury verdict is by definition willful and thus the court 
trebled  the  jury’s  royalty  rate.124  The  approach  taken  in 
Broadcom provides the same compensation to the plaintiff 
as a second lawsuit for willful infringement.  Moreover, since 
35 U.S.C. § 283 allows courts to issue injunctions “on such 
terms as the court deems reasonable”, the approach rests 
(citing  RESTATEMENT (SECOND)  OF JUDGMENTS §§  18–19  (1982)  (“The  general 
concept of claim preclusion is that when a final judgment is rendered on 
the merits, another action may not be maintained between the parties on 
the same ‘claim,’ and defenses that were raised or could have been raised 
in that action are extinguished.”).
122
1
. In  a concurring opinion,  Judge Rader suggested that  an ongoing 
royalty rate may be different than one awarded by a jury because of “the 
change in the parties’ legal relationship and other factors.”  Paice II,  504 
F.3d 1293, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, J., concurring).
123
1
. As discussed earlier, the  Broadcom court allowed the defendant a 
sunset  period  before  Broadcom  was  enjoined  from  infringement.   See 
supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
124
1
. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., SACV 05-467-JVS(RNBx), 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86627, at *19–*20  (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2007).
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on solid legal footing.125  However, as discussed above, 35 
U.S.C. § 283 does not apply when an injunction is not issued.
The  “do  nothing”  approach  takes  into  account  willful 
infringement  while  reconciling  eBay with  the  two  statutes 
that  would  appear  to  be  at  odds  with  ongoing  royalties. 
Section 154(a)(1) of the Patent Act grants a patentee “the 
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, 
or selling the invention”126  Indeed, forcing a plaintiff to pay 
an ongoing royalty appears to directly violate this statute.  In 
contrast, doing nothing would allow a patentee to continue 
to enforce its right to exclude.  After losing a first lawsuit, a 
defendant continues to infringe at its own peril.  Moreover, 
without the “do nothing” approach,  eBay appears to force 
courts to stretch 35 U.S.C.  § 283 to authorize an ongoing 
royalty remedy.
IV CONCLUSION
After eBay, permanent injunctions in patent cases will be 
granted based on the same four factor test used in other 
contexts.  The test requires courts to analyze: (1) whether 
the  plaintiff  will  suffer  irreparable  harm  without  the 
injunction; (2) whether there is an adequate remedy at law; 
(3) the balance of hardships on the respective parties; and 
(4)  whether  granting  an  injunction  would  disservice  the 
public interest.  Applying the four factor test in patent cases 
raises  two  sets  of  new  issues:  identifying  what  facts  are 
important  in  determining  whether  to  issue  a  permanent 
injunction  and  how  to  handle  future  infringement  after  a 
permanent injunction is denied.
As a threshold matter, the courts must determine what 
fact  patterns  are  important  in  deciding  whether  to  grant 
permanent  injunctions.  This  Article  has  analyzed  three 
categories of fact patterns that have figured prominently in 
deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction: (1) the 
existence, or lack of direct competition, (2) the institutional 
status of the plaintiff (e.g. research institution or troll), and 
(3) the relative contribution the patented invention has to 
the  infringing  device.   This  Article  argued  that  both  the 
existence  of  competition  and the  relative  contribution  the 
patented  invention  makes  to  the  infringing  device  should 
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play  an  important  role  in  deciding  whether  to  grant  a 
permanent injunction.  However, the institutional  status of 
the plaintiff should not.
In  arriving  at  these  conclusions,  this  Article  analyzed 
these  fact  patterns  by  critically  examining  the  decisions 
applying eBay’s four factor test to these facts and assessing 
whether the focusing on these fact patterns forwarded the 
goals of the patent system.  Broadly, the patent system is 
intended to promote innovation without stifling competition. 
Thus, this Article discusses how focusing on particular fact 
patterns would: promote the availability of technology, avoid 
market  players  from  incurring  unnecessary  costs,  and 
correctly  compensate  patent  holders  for  the  contribution 
their  inventions  make  to  any  infringement.    The  fact 
patterns  addressed  in  this  Article  are  prominent,  but  not 
exhaustive examples of  the problems courts  are currently 
addressing. As courts continue to confront new fact patterns 
in patent cases, they should also keep in mind the goals of 
the patent system when applying the four factor test.
For  the  first  time,  courts  are  not  granting  permanent 
injunctions to many successful patent plaintiffs.  Previously, 
permanent injunctions served to prevent losing defendants 
from continuing to infringe the plaintiff’s patents.  Thus, the 
second new major issue that courts must resolve after eBay 
is  examining  what  do  in  the  absence  of  a  permanent 
injunction.   Some  courts  have  replaced  the  permanent 
injunction with an ongoing royalty, a compulsory license that 
is  only  available  to  the  losing  defendant.   This  Article 
reviewed the  purported  basis  for  the  ongoing  royalty  and 
argues that the remedy is not grounded in either case law or 
statutory  authority.   However,  the  lack  of  an  alternative 
remedy is not as problematic as it would seem.  The courts 
do not need to replace permanent injunctions.  They can “do 
nothing” because the existing doctrine of willful infringement 
adequately  guards  a  patent  holder  against  future 
infringement by a losing defendant.
